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Abstract
The Iran Media Program publishes its groundbreaking 2011-2012 report on media consumption in Iran:
Finding a Way – How Iranians reach for news and information. The report was authored by Magdalena
Wojcieszak, Briar Smith and Mahmood Enayat and encompasses the results of two surveys conducted
over the past year: the first is a field-based, systematically recruited sample of Iranians in several major
metropolitan areas which mirrored the demographics of the country. The second study is an online
questionnaire among young, metropolitan, educated and technologically savvy Iranians, and was aimed at
illustrating the extent to which these youth employ new media for political purposes over a year after the
contested Iranian elections and during the Tunisia, Egypt and Libya uprisings. The report combines the
two studies for a comprehensive look at media consumption in Iran.
Both studies obtained information on what sources Iranians consider most important for news and
information, what kinds of new and traditional media are used and for what purposes, and which new
media are used to discuss various issues. The prevalence of Internet use, online activities, and speed of
access was assessed, as was the use of and engagement with certain platforms such as blogs,
Facebook and Twitter. The surveys also examined the use of circumvention tools as well as the extent to
which Iranians think citizens can be empowered through the use of new media.
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One of the main
articles of the
International Bill of Rights
grants the right to
freedom of expression.
-

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Islamic Republic
of Iran remains a signatory to, stresses that freedom of expression throughout the
world is a universal right. It includes the right of individuals to freely search, receive
and share information. However, with the establishment of state organs such as
the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards Cyber
Division and state policies on mass media and its many amendments, the Islamic
Republic of Iran continues to ensure access to information is one of the most restricted spheres of activity for all Iranian citizens both within and outside its borders
(Ansari & Danesh, 2011, p. 7).

Back to index

Introduction
-

Iranian media have attracted the attention of Western scholars after the contested 2009
elections, which generated discussion on the new media’s potential to promote citizen
participation in Iran (e.g., Baavur-Hendelman, 2007; Bucar & Fazaeli, 2008; Kelly &
Etling, 2008; Sreberny & Khiabany, 2007). Yet, existing research on general media use
in Iran – similarly to that in other non-democratic countries – has been limited given
the various challenges of conducting public opinion surveys in such contexts.
Few reports offer information on news media use in the country, and those that do are
limited in scope and depth. To our knowledge representative data on media use among
the Iranian population have been extremely limited. The “Media Environment Guide:
Iran” (2009) by BBC Monitoring details Iranian media and broadcasts to Iran, outlining
the domestic, international, and satellite TV channels, radio stations, and print sources. The report, however, does not provide information on whether and how Iranians
use these media. Complementing these data, the 2010 survey by InterMedia on behalf
of the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ International Audience Research Program
(IARP) tapped, among other issues, general media habits, TV viewership times, trust in
the media, reach of international and local radio stations, as well as internet access or
reach of some news websites.
While this study provides important information, its methodology necessarily imposes
limits on the conclusions that it reaches with regard to actual media use.1 Also, this
survey did not offer in-depth analysis of the political uses of various new information
and communication technologies that emerged as particularly important following
the 2009 contested election (see InterMedia/ BBG (IARP), 2009).
1 Specifically, a firm based in Istanbul obtained the responses by calling random numbers from an existing
database and - over the phone – asking respondents detailed questions (for details see the report
“Persian News Network & Radio Farda Programming to Iran – Survey Results”).
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Introduction

More recently, Gallup carried out a national study, on behalf of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors’ International Audience Research Program (IARP). The survey
offers rich information about access to and the usage of technologies such as television,
internet or mobile phones, the sources used for information, specific uses of new
media as well as political information sharing via various platforms, thus complementing
the results reported here. Nevertheless, although the survey is meant to be nationally representative, the mode of its administration (an Istanbul-based research team
conducting the interviews over the phone) places significant limits on the use of the
findings.
The popular uprisings that followed the elections have generated substantial
discussion among scholars, the general public, and civil society advocates on the
potential for tools such as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube to affect dissent and
activist organization in authoritarian countries (e.g., Christiansen, 2011; Dabashi,
2010; Esfandiari, June 7, 2010; Fathi, June 7, 2010; Howard, January 25, 2010;
Howard, December 18, 2009; Rahimi, 2011).
The massive upheavals that unfolded in and spread through the Middle East and North
Africa in 2011 and 2012 have intensified this discussion (e.g., Howard et al., 2011). Both
in Iran and, during the collective phenomena termed the Arab Spring, in Tunisia, Egypt,
or Syria, some reformist activists have deployed new media tools to effect change. Spikes
in online revolutionary conversations could also be observed before major events on
the ground (see Howard et al., 2011). These observations have contributed to assumptions about social media and their role (central or otherwise) in instigating and shaping
these events, leading to attractive monikers, such as Twitter or Facebook Revolutions
(see Wojcieszak, Smith & Enayat, 2012).2
Yet, other observers – including those who offer the above evidence – have been skeptical that the uprisings in Iran and the Arab Spring were substantially strengthened by
new technologies. Some have stated that revolutions “will not be tweeted,” noting that
Twitter or Facebook were not used for organizing as widely as it is believed (Gladwell,
2010), showing that most Twitter feeds after the election originated outside Iran and
reminding the public that the states themselves used new media as a means to target
their perceived enemies and to advance in the so-called Soft War (Morozov, 2011).

2 For example, as Nazanine Moshiri, a correspondent for Al Jazeera English, writes “Despite restrictions on 		
access to Facebook in Iran, according to worldpress.org, it is estimated that around 700,000 users were active 		
from February 2008 to June 2009. (…) [D]espite a massive Internet clampdown in the Islamic Republic, the BBC
says it was receiving around eight videos a minute at the height of the 2009 unrest. Al Jazeera does not have
any concrete numbers, but it ran a special Iran desk, monitoring news coming in from Twitter and YouTube” (p. 30).
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Introduction

Towards addressing these issues with a systematic and scholarly approach, the
Annenberg School for Communication’s Iran Media Program conducted two studies
that were aimed at providing a more complete picture of both traditional and new
media use in Iran.
The first study involved a field study of a systematically recruited sample of Iranians,
which mirrored the demographics of the country. This study aimed to comprehensively
portray general media consumption patterns in the country. The second study, an
online questionnaire among young, metropolitan, educated and technologically savvy
Iranians, was aimed at illustrating the extent to which these youth employ new media
for political purposes over a year after the contested Iranian elections and during the
Tunisia, Egypt or Libya uprisings.
If new technologies in fact played a crucial role in Iran, one would hope that
citizens – once activated and empowered – would continue using these technologies
for strategizing and exchanges about pressing political issues, especially during
the wide-scale mobilizing in the region (see Howard, January 25, 2010).
Both studies obtained information on how people in Iran engage with and use various
media outlets, mobile, and online/offline communication tools. We paid particular
attention to new media technologies, reporting on the use of websites, citizen blogs,
Twitter feeds, and SMS text messages. We also included comprehensive lists of
traditional news media, such as television, radio and newspapers, and also tapped
some other forms of communication such as interpersonal relationships, sermons, or
citizen discussion in public places (e.g., taxi cabs or shops) that could play important
information and messaging roles.
We first address the findings from our national survey to then focus on information
obtained from the Iranian youth.

Back to index

Part I

Media use among
Iranians
Results from
field-based research

The data for the first study was collected in the field in Iran by an international
Who are the
respondents?

market research company engaged by the IMP. The current sample was recruited
in the four major urban areas of Iran – Tehran (50%), Mashhad (20%), Tabriz (15%)
and Shiraz (15%) (see Appendix 1 for sampling strategy and recruitment).
The interviewing – done between 15 January and 29 February 2012 – yielded 1022 fully
completed questionnaires (for a response rate of 30%). Fifty two-percent of the respondents were male, the mean age was 37, and 69% were married. With regard to
education, the major educational category consisted of high school graduates (see
Figure 1).

What
information
sources do
they use?

The overarching purpose of the study was to improve our understanding of the Iranian
media environment, by examining how Iranians use various media out-lets and online,
mobile, and offline communication tools.3

3 These findings are comparable to the results of the aforementioned InterMedia survey, which found that – when
probing about daily exposure – television was the most frequently used source (89%), followed by radio, newspapers
(18% each) and the Internet (8%). There, 35% reported using SMS daily for information. The weekly usage of radio,
newspapers, and the internet for news was higher, standing at 35%, 41%, and 19%, respectively.Similarly, the recent
BBG survey (2012) found that 100% of the interviewed Iranians had a working TV in their home, 82% reported watching
it yesterday, and over 90% in the past week, and TV was also a dominant daily source of information for 86% of the
sample, followed by mobile phones (18%), radio (16%) and newspapers (16%).

Figure 1
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First study data: collected inside Iran –
A study of the general Iranian population
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New communication technologies
versus old media?
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New
communication
technologies
versus
old media?

Overwhelmingly, traditional news media (TV, radio or press) were more frequently
selected as the main information sources than new media (the internet or text messages). Interpersonal contacts such as family and friends (strong ties) and neighbors
or acquaintances (considered weak ties, see Granovetter, 1973) were more often
selected than new media. These results may not be surprising since Internet penetration is low in Iran, and unfettered access to in Iran is rare due to heavy filtering and
blocking webpages, DDoS, and intentionally slow internet speeds.

Figure 2
What were the most
important sources
of information?
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New communication technologies
versus old media?
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What are the most important
sources of information?
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In Iran, SMS texting is a popular advertising medium and frequently used for exchanging
jokes, but it is less commonly used for news and information purposes. While SMS is
subject to less government intervention, there have been reports this year of blocking
SMS text messages that contain certain content that is socially or politically sensitive.4
Because regular access to new media can be described as problematic in Iran, it is
unsurprising that respondents indicate a high degree of reliance on family networks
– which tend to be extended and close-knit – for information. That is, in general, in
Middle Eastern societies, “traditional state control of the information media has often
meant that more reliance is placed on oral and unofficial means of communications, in
the mosque, the coffeehouse, or the marketplace” (Fandy, 2000, p. 378).

What are the
most important
sources of
information?

When asked – out of the sources listed – to select their 3 most important news sources,
TV was the first choice for a staggering 96% of the sample, followed by the press (45%)
and friends and family (38%). The finding that so few respondents selected taxis, shops,
cafés, and the mosque may suggest that – at least for our sample and at this time –
public places are an uneasy space for information gathering and exchange, possibly
due to the present political situation in Iran and the culture of guarded behavior and
speech in public. But these observations must be tempered by the listing of strong ties
(family and friends) and weak ties (neighbors or acquaintances) as important outlets
for political information, potentially pointing to the trust that people place in their social networks, and which may be lacking in other public contexts.

4 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/iran-currency-idUSL6E8CA2MQ20120110

13

What are the most important
sources of information?

Naturally, there were variations by age, with the Internet being far more popular
among the younger cohort (between 18-28 year old, 30% reported it was their most
important information source, as compared to 0% among those over 59).
Figure 3
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Similarly, SMS text messages and work contacts were also more popular among
the younger demographics. In contrast, the older demographics relied more heavily than
the younger on such information sources as weak ties, mosque and religious leaders,

What are the most important
sources of information?

and radio. Television, not shown in Figure 3 in order to more clearly illustrate the
patterns, was uniformly popular among all age groups (e.g., 96% of those between 18
and 28, 98% of those between 39 and 48, and 95% of those over 59).
Among those who selected TV as the most important source (96% of the respondents,
978 people), the most frequently chosen channel was the state-run and stateowned IRIB TV (selected by 86% of those 978 people).5 IRIB was followed by BBC Persian
TV (selected by 9% of those respondents)6 and Manoto (selected by 4%).7 On the one
hand, these results may be due to the reluctance on the part of the respondents to admit
that they use satellite TV, which is illegal in Iran.Yet, the survey included a follow-up
question that inquired about satellite television use and was worded in a way that implicitly legitimized the use of satellite TV.8
Also substantiating our results, the aforementioned report by InterMedia similarly
found that the IRIB Channel 1 and 2 had over 84% and 81% reach, respectively (InterMedia / BBG (IARP), 2009). Further increasing our confidence in these findings, the
recent BBG survey (2012) reports that the IRIB channels are among the three most
important information sources for 86% of the interviewed Iranians, followed by domestic newspapers (11%) and local radio stations (10%). That survey finds that only 2%
of the respondents select international TV channels among their three most important
sources of news about current events, despite the fact that 19% reported having
watched them in the past week.
As before, the preferences varied with age. The latest Europe-based commercial station,
Manoto, was the most popular among the younger demographics (used by 7% of
those between 18-28 and 4.5% of those 29-38), while not constituting an important
source for the Iranians over 59 years of age (0%). In contrast, the older Iranians tended
to rely on the state-controlled IRIB channels to a slightly greater extent than the Iranian
5 This high of a percentage of IRIB TV viewers may be partly due to the fact that this response option was not divided
into channels; rather, respondents were asked about IRIB as a whole. For example, IRIB 3 plays live football
matches, which are popular in Iran, while other IRIB channels provide more “propagandistic” political content.
6 Similarly, according to a report published by BBC Persian TV, its audience increased to 6 million in 2012,
suggesting – exactly as found by our survey and underscoring its reliability as validated by external viewership
statistics – that roughly 1 out of 10 Iranians watches this channel (BBC Persian TV, 29 February 2012).
7 Manoto is comprised of two channels, Manoto 1 and Manoto 2. Manoto 1 mostly broadcasts entertainment, with
about 40% of the programs being original content and the rest dubbed into Persian. It has no live programs; even
the news shown once a day from Monday to Thursday is pre-recorded with almost all content taken from other
news media outlets and with no original content. Manoto 2 features documentaries bought from other sources,
dubbed and subtitled in Persian (see Azarmehr, 2011).
8 First, the interviewer asked “Thinking about the past month, which TV channels have you used for news and information about politics and current events. Please mention all those that you have used in the past month, local and
satellite.” After probing “Anything else?,” the interviewers asked a brief follow up question: ”Do you also use any
satellite channels for news and information? Which ones?”
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What are the most important
sources of information?

youth: these channels were selected by between 77-78% of those between 18 and 28,
up to 96% of those over 63 years of age. The differences among the age groups were
not as pronounced for other television stations.
From those who selected radio as one of the 3 main sources of information (26% or
264 people), 31% chose Radio Payam (Message Radio), a state-owned 24-hour national
station that broadcasts news, plays music and announces the traffic in Tehran, as
the most important station. It was followed by Radio Javan (Youth Radio) (22%, a stateowned station that caters to a younger audience, amidst what it says is the “cultural
invasion” of foreign radio stations and media outlets) and local stations (16.5%).9
With regard to the most frequently chosen newspapers, among those who selected
the press among the most important sources (465 individuals or 45.5% of the sample),
Hamshahri, a conservative daily newspaper, which has been in print for over fifteenyears and is also recognized as Iran’s first full color newspaper, was in first place
(41%). It was followed by Khorasan (16%, Iran’s oldest local newspaper, reporting
news on social, cultural, and political events; printed in both Mashhad and Tehran,
and distributed nationally) and Khabare Jonub (7%, a daily provincial paper catering
to Iran’s southern region and covering a range of topics from culture to politics).
Lastly, there was a substantial dispersion with regard to the most important news
websites. Among those for whom the internet was among the top three news sources
(19% of the sample or 192 individuals), Google news was selected most frequently
(16%), followed by the BBC Persian website (9.5%), Tabnak (9%, a conservative news
site associated with members of the Sepah – Army of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution; its main language is Persian, with recently added sections in English
and Arabic) and Fars News (8%, referred to as a “semi-official” news site, because of
its close but unofficial ties to the Revolutionary Guard Corps; its mission statement
claims that the tenants of the Islamic Revolution as defined in the constitution is what
guides them). Balatarin, the independent online platform that aggregates links from
users and is the Persian-language version of Digg was selected by only 1 person out of
the 192 who relied on the internet as one of their 3 most important news sources.
The BBG study (2012), which included a less detailed list and did not specifically ask
about informational websites, found that Google was the most visited website in the
prior week (62% of the respondents reported accessing it), followed by Yahoo (44%)
and Facebook (13%).

9 With regard to radio, the InterMedia report states that the most popular international radio station was Radio Farda,
reaching 4% of Iranians weekly.
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What about
new communication
and
information technologies?
-

As other reports have found, fewer than half of our respondents were internet users
Internet
use

(see http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/207053/ict/internet). When asked whether
their household had Internet access, 47% indicated that it has access at present,
8.4% that it doesn‘t but did in the past, and 43% indicated that it never had access.
Fewer than half (40% or 413 individuals) were current internet users, 7% (74 people)
used the internet in the past, and 52% (535 respondents) never used the internet.10
Internet use is unsurprisingly strongly dependent on age. Roughly 60% of the younger
demographic (18-28) have internet access at home, compared to 24% of those above
59 years old. A similar story emerges when respondents are asked whether they
personally use the Internet or whether they have used the Internet anywhere in the
past. As Figure 4 demonstrates, 61% of the youngest cohort reports being a current
user, as compared to 4% of those above 59. Similarly, roughly 1 in 3 of the youngest
respondents reports never having used the internet, as compared to 94% of those
above 59.
10 Statistics relating to the number of Internet users in Iran are inconsistent and highly disputed. Until 2009, the single
official source of internet use data in Iran was the International Telecommunication Union that based its statistics
numbers from the government on different ICT indicators. According to official sources, (http://goo.gl/a3EQu) the
methodology used by the Iranian government to calculate the number of Internet users was a forecast of the number
of potential users based on the available bandwidth. Therefore, the reported numbers (34%) did not correspond to
the actual number of Internet users at all. However, in 2009 and 2011, the Iran Statistics Center conducted surveys
on Internet use in Iran. The results of this survey were published in March 2010 and March 2012. The latest survey
puts the penetration rate at 21.4% among Iranian households. These surveys have resulted in a correction of data re
ported by the ITU as well. http://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/0/Files/abstract/1389/n_IT_89.pdf The aforementioned
BBG study (2012) reports that 43% of the respondents have working internet at home, and that 20% used it in the
past week.

17

Figure 4
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Online activities of internet users
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As shown in Figure 4, the majority of regular internet users (66.5%) reported going
online at home, 14% at work, 9% at internet cafés, 4% in school or university, 3%
via a mobile phone, while 2.5% at other person’s home.11 The two most frequent
internet connections were broadband up to 128 kbps and (16.8%) and dial up (16.4%),
while broadband over 128 kbps (8%) and wimax (4%) were much less frequent.12

Online
activities of
internet users

Did the interviewed Iranians use the various new media tools, such as social
networks, Twitter or blogs? Or was the use of these technologies constrained to
a small sample of the Iranian elite?
The questions about online activities were asked only to those who were internet users.
Among the analyzed sample, more respondents reported reading blogs (42% of the
internet users or 20% of the sample, 203 people) than belonging to online social networks (20% of the internet users or 10% of the sample, 99 individuals). Also, 18% of
the users (8.5% of the sample, 87 people) reported commenting on blogs, and 8% of the
users (4% of the sample, 41 people) writing their own blog (15 of them update it less
than once a month, 9 about once a month, 4 about every 2 weeks, 7 about once a week,
3 several times a week but not every day and 2 every day).13
Twitter was, as of early this year, the least prevalent new media tool (used by 10
respondents – 2% of internet users, 1% of the entire sample). This finding is directly parallel to the BBG’s 2012 study which also found that 2% of users accessed the
internet to use Twitter. Among this small group, half joined Twitter about a year prior
to the interview,10% about 2 years prior and 40% have been using it for more than 3
years, which would correspond with the turbulent events following the 2009 election.
Further putting the alleged power of Twitter in a sobering perspective, only one respondent reported using Twitter every day to share updates, see others’ updates, or other
activities. Three respondents did it once a month and the majority of this small group (6
respondents) used Twitter less than once a month.

11 The BBG survey (2012) reports higher percentages of access in the various sites (e.g., 80% of their respondents
accessed the internet at home, 34% in internet cafés, and 28% at work, 21% at school, and 19% over a mobile phone).
12 The results which show that broadband connections (all types) are more frequent in Iran than dial up connections
are in contrast with official figures. The Statistics Center of Iran announced in March 2012 that 85% of Internet users
in Iran use dial up connection (see http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/207053/ict/internet). The discrepancy between the Statistics Center and our results may be due to the higher internet penetration rate in major cities in which
we conducted the survey (link: http://www.amar.org.ir/Default.aspx?tabid)
13 Asking about online activities in a different manner, the BBG survey found that 51% of the sample accessed the internet to ‘learn about a topic,’ 44% to email, 35% to find latest news. That survey also found that 16% reported posting
to a blog and 13% to a social networking site.

Figure 5
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How do internet users use social networks?
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Mobile phone use
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Mobile phones were also credited with fomenting unrest after the election and
Mobile phone
use

correspondents in Tehran reported that the government was preventing access to the
mobile phone network, perhaps attesting to the crucial role it was playing (see Robinson, 2009).
We thus inquired about mobile phones, attempting to tap the extent to which
they were used for communication about sociopolitical issues roughly two years
after the contested election.
A solid majority of the sample (91% or 931 individuals) reported having cell phones,
with a majority (79% of these individuals) having used it to send text messages in the
past month. The finding regarding mobile phone penetration is consistent with a recent
report, according to which mobile phone penetration is 91.2% in Iran (September 2011,
see http://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news-146580.aspx) and with the BBG study (2012),
which also finds that 90% of respondents had a working cell phone.

Figure 6
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When it comes to more advanced cell phone uses, 35% of the respondents reported
recording videos on their mobile phone in the past month.
Again speaking to the limited – among this systematic sample – potential of new media
to spread information and mobilize citizens, only 5% of those who recorded content on
their cell phones (15 individuals) uploaded videos from their mobile phone to the Internet
(e.g., Youtube, Vimeo, or other online video portals) in the past month. Roughly half
(48%) reported having sent or received content through Bluetooth (mostly about once a
month; 30% of the users).
The use of these technologies varies by age. Figure 7 indicates that the younger demographics are substantially more likely than the older ones to have a mobile phone, send
text messages, record videos on their phones, and use Bluetooth.

Figure 7
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In order to assess the political potential of new media, it is not sufficient to analyze
Discussed
topics

whether people are using various platforms. It is also essential to examine the specific
issues that the users communicate about via social networks, blogs, Twitter and text
messages. Those who reported belonging to a social network, reading, commenting on
or writing blogs, and/or sending or receiving Tweets and text messages were presented with a list of various topics, and asked to check all those they had communicated
about over each tested platform during the last month.
On online social networks, most respondents discussed social (32%), personal (37%)
and work-related issues (23%). At the same time, many of them talked about news
(29%) and culture (30%), which – in Iran are both politically charged topics. On online
blogs, news was again the most frequently sought out topic (35%), followed by sports
(34%) and social issues (33%). When it comes to commenting on and writing blogs,
respondents most often focused on culture and social issues (about 33%).

It is widely acknowledged that the Iranian authorities attempt to block and slow
Circumvention
tools

access to a variety of websites considered politically or culturally sensitive, creating
impediments to accessing content online (see Saminejad, 2011).14
In fact, the recent Freedom House (2010) ranking ranks Iran as last in Internet
freedom among the 37 countries assessed.15
Yet, the evidence on the extent to which Iranians use circumvention tools has been
limited due to the sensitive nature of the issue. Even though some circumvention tools
like VPNs are widely available and frequently used in Iran, their use remains illegal.
To mitigate the unease a direct question about circumvention tool use would cause
respondents, our survey probed about these issues in a non-confrontational manner,
which avoided directly questioning whether respondents used any of these tools.
Respondents were first asked how often they found it difficult to access information and
content on the Web when they were online, such as encountering blocked or filtered
websites.
14 The Law of Computer Crimes, approved by Iran‘s parliament in January 2009, has been used to prosecute and
repress activists and bloggers, with 56 articles in the following categories: Immoral content, Anti-Islamic content,
Anti-security and disturbing the public peace, Criminal content regarding intellectual property and audio and
visual issues, Content encourages, invites or provokes others to commit criminal acts, Content against state and
public institutions and their responsibilities, and Content used to facilitate other computer crimes, among others
(see Esfandiari, 2011, p. 23).
15 As Asgard (2011) summarizes: “The IRI ranked 187th out of 199 nations in Press Freedom according to Freedom
House‘s 2010 report on Global Press Freedom; was designated as ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House‘s 2011 Freedom in
the World report; and ranked 171st out of 179 nations in Economic Freedom according to the Heritage Foundation‘s
2010 report on Global Economic Freedom” (p.17).

Figure 8
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The responses were equally distributed (16% reported that they never encounter such
problems, 18% rarely, 21% sometimes, 24% often and 20% always). The survey probed
further, using hypothetical language to ensure the security and safety of respondents,
as well as the likelihood of answering honestly. After mentioning that some people use
various online tools that help circumvent blocked websites, we asked whether respondents have ever heard about such tools. A solid majority (73.5%) have not heard about
these tools.16
Among those who said they were familiar with these tools (the remaining 26.5%), a
majority reported that it would be either easy (43%) or very easy (19%) to find and
access such tools, 27% would find it difficult, 6.5% very difficult and 5% nearly impossible.
Yet, as the figure shows, respondents would not feel very secure using online tools that
help circumvent blocked websites, with nearly half (46%) reporting they would feel insecure or very insecure using them.
Figure 9
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Lastly, when asked to rate their ability to use circumvention tools, respondents who
have heard about them rated their ability as rather low (i.e., 22% bad, 29% poor, 28%
fair, 22% good and 8% excellent).
Unsurprisingly, as our additional analyses have found, it was the younger, male,
and more educated respondents who were more likely to know about circumvention
tools.
Also, familiarity with these tools was higher among those who named the internet
among one of the three most important news sources, those who used social
16 This question is similar to the one about watching satellite television: because the tools themselves are illegal,
respondents are likely uncomfortable answering questions that target their knowledge or use of these tools. The actual
number of people familiar with the existence of circumvention tools is almost certainly much higher among internet
users in Iran.
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networks, read and commented on blogs, as well as those who thought that new
media make public officials more responsive – but not necessarily among those who
thought that new media increase understanding of politics among the citizenry.
Interestingly, having Internet access and writing blogs were both unrelated to having
heard about circumvention tools.

We also assessed the extent to which respondents thought that new media could
Empowerment
via
new media

empower citizens.
We asked:
“Some people think that new media technologies (e.g., Internet, Twitter, mobile phones) will change the way people influence politics, others think that this is not the
case. How much do you agree or disagree with the statements that ‘Through the use
of new media technologies, people like me can better understand government and
politics’ and ‘Public officials will pay more attention to what people like me have to
say’?”
On the one hand, the responses to the two questions were relatively evenly distributed
among our sample. Notably, however, although the two items were significantly related, (those believing in the potential of new media to increase citizen understanding
also believe that officials will be more responsive to the citizenry), the respondents
expressed greater confidence in new media empowering them personally, rather than it
making governmental officials more responsive (with the averaged responses being
3.28 versus 2.87 on a scale from 1 “Disagree strongly” to 5 “Agree Strongly” where 3
indicated “Neither agree nor disagree”).
Notably, no differences emerged among the respondents with regard to age or gender
about the extent to which they agreed with these statements. However, when it comes to
education, those who have not graduated high school seemed to be the least likely group
to think that new media will increase people’s understanding (but not that officials will
pay more attention to the people).
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Part II

Media use among
Iranians
Youth survey

Iranians (…) are among the most sophisticated and eager consumers of information. They continue to find creative and imaginative ways to get around [governmental] limitations. Over the past three decades, particularly the younger generation of
Iranians have become increasingly cosmopolitan in their outlook and have developed
an insatiable thirst for global news and views. Their long-standing experience in
handling state-sponsored censorship has equipped them with a keen ability to read
between the lines and distinguish between genuine and manufactured information.
This ability to compare and comprehend the underlying realities of communication
stands out in their sense of objectivity and self-reliance manifested during the recent
months of consistent uprising, both in Iran and around the globe (Ansari & Danesh,
2011, p. 8).
To offer a fuller portrayal of media use in Iran, and especially of the potential of new
media for sociopolitical exchange and mobilization, the Iran Media Program conducted
another survey targeting Iranian youth. To our knowledge, this is the first such study
which measures this set of questions specifically among Iranian youth, especially important given the demographics of Iranian society in general and of the Green Movement protesters in particular. The link to the Persian-language survey was included on a
file sharing platform (www.4shared.com) which, according to Alexa (www.alexa.com/
topsites/countries/IR), is the 20th topmost visited site in Iran. 4shared, which is not
filtered in Iran, has recognized the extent of their popularity amongst Iranians and provided full functionality in the Persian language. Its users can create collections of files
which are then searchable in Google, effectively making it a huge database of easily
searchable content. The link to the online survey was active between March and late
April, 2011. Overall, 2802 respondents completed the questionnaire.

Who are the respondents?
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As intended by he nature of the platform on which participants were recruited, the
Who are
the
respondents?

sample was young and technologically savvy. Over 80% of the respondents were
under 30 years old (14% - 18-20, 39% 21 – 25, and 27% 26 - 30). A solid majority (92%)
was male, perhaps reflecting a gender gap in downloading or sharing content online.
Respondents were also highly educated, with the majority (78%) having some university degree and almost 20% having an MA or a PhD. They came from Tehran province
(37%), Fars (11%) and Isfahan (8%), with other provinces being less represented.17
As these characteristics suggest, the sample could represent those reformist activists
who – following the 2009 election – deployed new media to effect change, allowing us
to shed some light on the extent to which new media are used for political purposes.
As previously mentioned, the hope would be that – once empowered by new technologies after the contested election – young Iranians would continue using new media
for mobilization and exchanges about pressing political issues, especially during the
turbulent events in the region in 2011. It is understood that Iranian authorities curbed
the use of the internet and new media by Iranian citizens to a much greater extent than
before, and that the internet and social media platforms became much more problematic after the election protests. To some extent, this survey can be said to be taking
the temperature of the post-2009 new media environment in Iran.
To assure comparability, both questionnaires – the field-based and the online
version – contained the same questions, focusing on media use patterns and paying
particular attention to new technologies.

What
information
sources do
Iranians use?

As before, one of the purposes of the survey was to assess where respondents turn
for information about politics and current events. The survey provided twelve options
ranging from friends and family, to government officials, to traditional media, and
respondents could select all that applied. Because we sampled only Internet users, it
is not surprising that most of them turn to the Internet for news (89%).
Television was the second most often selected source (70%), followed by friends and
family (49%), print media (42%) and work or school (33%). Despite the fact that our
sample was young, well-educated and mostly based in cities, governmental officials
(18%) and religious leaders (10%) were also valued information sources.

17 Partly speaking to these data, the BBG survey (2012) found that 15% of females, versus 25% of males, reporting
using the internet “yesterday,” and that the younger demographics (e.g., 15-34) accessed it “yesterday” substantially
more than the older (e.g., over 55 years old; 24% versus 9%).
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Consistent with the notion of the politicized public sphere in the Arab countries,
it could be expected that Iranian citizens receive information from non-conventional
sources, such as other people or public spaces. Yet, and similarly to the general population sample, most respondents (87%) did not select either taxis or shops as their
inform-ation sources, 10.5% relied on one of these sources and only 3% mentioned
both.
This finding can again be attributed to the distinct separation of public and private
space in Iran and the more strict code of conduct governing interpersonal interactions
in the public sphere versus the private sphere.
Figure 10
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These findings indicate that – when compared to other sources of information that
were listed in this question – new media were most frequently used: only 11% did
not select either the internet or text messages. In comparison, 21% of the sample did
not select one of the traditional news media (TV, radio or press). At the same time,
old media were still prevalent, with 11% selecting all three traditional outlets as their
sources of information.

Figure 11
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When asked to provide a ranked list of their 3 most important sources, 56% of respondents selected the Internet as their first choice, 24% chose TV and 7% chose friends
and family. TV was most often selected as the second most important source (31%),
followed by the Internet (21.5%) and friends and family (14%). Strong ties were selected

New communication technologies
versus old media?

as the third most important source in 19% of cases, followed by the press (16%) and
TV (14%). When we collapse these data, the Internet emerges as the central outlet for
news (85%), followed by television (67%) and friends and family (39%).
We also asked about the specific outlets used. Consistent with the findings from the
general population survey and with the reports from InterMedia and BBG, among those
for whom TV was among the three most important outlets, the most important source
of news and information about politics and current events was the state-run and stateowned IRIB network (62% selected this station as one of their most important),
followed by BBC Persian (55%) and Voice of America/Persian News Network(30%).
Our numbers for satellite TV channels are low compared to other statistics on the
topic:
“Some 45% to 60% of Iranians watch satellite TV, according to estimates from the
state media company and an Iranian research center, exceeding the number believed
to use the Internet.” 18
It is not known why the reported use of satellite TV is so low in this survey. It is possible that the respondents were apprehensive that the survey was a covert attempt to
capture whether they engaged in behaviors for which they could be later penalized (e.g.,
satellite use). If that is the case, the answers to this question would underestimate the
actual extent of reliance on satellite TV.19
There was again a large dispersion when it comes to the most frequently accessed
websites. Among those who selected the internet as the most important information
source (85% of the sample or 2392 individuals), the BBC Persian website – filtered
in the Islamic Republic of Iran – was selected most frequently (38% of respondents
indicated that it was one of the most important informational internet sites), followed
by Tabnak (27%), Balatarin (25% of respondents, also filtered), Kaleme (which belongs
to reformist candidate and Green Movement leader Mir-Hussein Mousavi, also filtered –
19%), the aforementioned conservative Fars News (18%), Aftab (17%, linked to former
President Hashemi Rafsanjani; although it gives coverage to various topics its main
focus is politics) and Voice of America in Persian (17%, also filtered).

18 It is important to note that satellite dishes are technically illegal in Iran, although their use is fairly widespread.
There are some important impediments to satellite TV use, such as occasional confiscation raids, as well as
jamming of satellite signals, which the regime does to BBC Persian and other satellite channels.
See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203501304577088380199787036.html
19 The high self-reported visiting of filtered websites in this report undermines this explanation for the low
numbers reporting satellite TV viewing.
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All respondents were internet users, given that the survey was distributed online.
Asked where they most frequently accessed the internet, a solid majority (84%)
responded that they accessed it at home, followed by work (36.5%) and university or
school (33%), their cell phone (30%) and internet café (25%).

Given that the respondents were recruited on a file sharing downloading website, it
Internet
use

comes as no surprise that broadband access over 128 kbps was the most prevalent form of
internet connections (50%). This is despite the fact that according to Iranian law, users
should not be accessing the internet at over 128 kbps, with some exceptions for profession, such as university students, doctors, engineers, etc. Broadband up to 128 kbps
was used by 28.5% of respondents, while wimax and dial-up were equally prevalent
(8%).20

More respondents reported reading blogs (92%) and commenting on blogs (70%)
Online
activities

than belonging to social networks (68%). These statistics undergird the existence of
a vibrant Persian language blogosphere, with Persian as the fourth most widely-used
language on blogs.21 More than half of our respondents (54%) did report writing their
own blog, although only 40.5% of those with their own blog reported updating it less
than once a month, 17.5% about once a month, and only 8% reported doing so every
day or several times a day.
Despite the central role that Twitter allegedly played in the uprisings in Iran, it was
the least prevalent new media platform used by our sample. Only 17% reported using
Twitter to share or follow tweets. Among the users, most had joined in the past 6
months (34.5%), 21% had started using Twitter about a year ago and only 22% had
started two years ago, which would have coincided with the contested election. When it
comes to the frequency, among those who used Twitter, 33% reported sharing or
following tweets about once a month. Only 11% of this group used Twitter every day
and 7% tweeted or read tweets several times a day. This usage and frequencies are
20 Additionally, we analyzed who the individuals were who reported high speed internet use, and also where these
users accessed the internet. The analyses found that the probability of having broadband access at over 128 kbps
was higher among the younger male respondents than among the older and female respondents. Also, this
probability was lower among Tehran-based users than among others (controlling for all other factors). Listing the
internet as the most important information source was a positive predictor of high speed broadband access, whereas
perceived empowerment via new media did not matter. Accessing the internet at home and at work was related to
higher probability of high speed connection, whereas those who mostly accessed at internet cafés had a lower
probability of accessing via high speed connection, despite the fact that internet cafés tend to have higher speeds.
Neither university nor library access were significantly related despite the fact that university students routinely
have access to higher speed internet, both at home and at university.
21 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2004/dec/20/iran.blogging
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unsurprisingly higher than among the general population sample. Nevertheless, the
prevalence and the extent to which this technologically savvy metropolitan youth uses
Twitter is still relatively limited.
This finding supports the opinions of some observers who are skeptical of the central
role played by Twitter at the time. Radio Free Europe journalist Golnaz Esfandiari noted
that “[s]imply put: There was no Twitter Revolution inside Iran” (June 7, 2010, p. 1),
and the manager of Balatarin said that “once you look, you see most of it is Americans
tweeting among themselves” (Musgrove, June 17, 2009; see also Burns & Eltham 2009).
Some Iranian bloggers further noted that “A very small percentage of those online
are in Iran, yet some two million of the Diaspora are actively connected. If we look at
all the [political] movements (…) many of the key players have now left the country”
(Valadbaygi, quoted in Esfandiari, 2011, p. 23).

As with the general population, a vast majority of the respondents (96%) reported
Mobile phone
use

having a cell phone, and nearly all of those who did have one (99%) used it to send
text messages in the past month (with 50% texting several times a day, 21.5% at least
once a day and 20% several times a week, but not every day). When it comes to more
advanced cell phone uses, about one-third of the sample reported sending or receiving
content via Bluetooth, with roughly half doing so about once a month or less (48%).

Figure 12
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As previously mentioned, in order to assess the political potential of new media, it
Discussed
topics

is essential to examine the specific issues that the users communicate about via social
networks, blogs, Twitter and text messages. Somewhat surprisingly, political issues
did not top the agenda despite the fact that the survey took place during the uprisings
in the region. On the one hand, respondents did rely on social networks to facilitate
conversations about news and current events (44%), foreign affairs (32%), community
(25%), and economy (21%). Nevertheless, these issues were less prevalent than
personal topics, which were discussed on social networks by 54% of respondents.
Pressing social issues, such as the environment (11%) or women’s rights (10%) were
less often discussed there.
Politics was yet less common in the blogosphere. As Figure 13 shows, even though
the respondents reported reading blogs about news and current events, foreign affairs,
or the economy, these topics were far less popular when it came to creating content in
the blogosphere. Also, political topics were less popular than science/IT-oriented ones,

Figure 13
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most often addressed when commenting on and writing blogs.22 Work-related and
social topics were also among the most often read about, commented on, and blogged
about.
Amongst those who tweeted, news and current events (selected by 40% of Twitter
users), science/IT-related issues (38%) and personal topics (also 38%) were equally
important. With regard to text messages, perhaps unsurprisingly, personal topics
emerged as the most prevalent subject (76%), followed by work (41%) and social issues
(21%). Those who had sent or received Bluetooth contents most often transmitted
content related to personal (51%), followed by social (28%) and cultural issues (25%).

22 It is important to note here that the Iranian political environment is often a pervasive theme that is interwoven into
all subject areas. For example, science and IT related issues are not necessarily political in many of the locations
where these survey questions are often deployed, but in Iran, as in other closed societies, IT issues are very often tied
to matters of free speech, internet access, discussions of blocking/filtering and VPNs or proxies, and other ways of
using technology to increase freedom of expression or access to information and entertainment.
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A majority of our respondents (71%) reported that they either often (38%) or always
Circumvention
tools

(33%) find it difficult to access content on the Web, such as encountering blocked
websites. Similarly, and unlike with the systematic sample, a solid majority (79%) have
heard about online tools that help circumvent blocked websites. Among those, 51.5%
reported that it would be either easy or very easy to find and access such tools, but many
said they would not feel secure using them (15% would feel “very insecure” and 26%
“insecure”). When asked to rate their ability to use circumvention tools, most respondents rated it as either fair (34%), good (34%), or excellent (22%).
Analyses found that those respondents who used social networks and Twitter and
who sent or received text messages and Bluetooth contents reported coming across
blocked websites more often than those who did not use these platforms. Interestingly,
blog use was unrelated to encountering blocked websites. We found that older users
were less likely to express ease of access to and comfort with using circumvention tools
and that males living in the Tehran area with broadband access were more likely to
express comfort accessing and using circumvention tools. Telling patterns emerged
when it came to new media use.

Figure 14
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Two years after the election and during the upheavals in the region, we surveyed opiniEmpowerment
via
new media

ons among this youthful population about new media’s ability to change the way people
influence politics. In general, and similarly to the general population, respondents
were more confident that new media could increase people’s political understanding,
but less confident that new media somehow make public officials more attentive to the
citizenry.
Who felt most empowered by new media? We found that respondents who were both
older and better educated, and those who listed the internet as one of the three most
important news sources, were more confident that empower the citizenry than the
younger, less educated and those for whom the Internet was not central for information. In addition, social networking, commenting on blogs, and sending text messages
were positively related to the conviction that, through new media, people can better
understand politics. With regard to censorship, respondents who often encountered
blocked websites and those skilled in the use of circumvention tools had a greater
sense that new media increase citizen political understanding than those who rarely
came across blocked content and did not have the skills to circumvent the blockages.
Contrastingly, those who relied on neighbors or acquaintances for information were
less confident in the political power of new media. Similarly, writing blogs – as well as
relying on religious leaders for news – was negatively related to the conviction that,
through new media, people can better understand politics.
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Summary
-

When an election is over, new media habits remain. Elections have become sensitive moments in which student leaders, journalists, and civil society groups
experiment with digital technologies. Even if their preferred candidates are not
elected, the process of experimentation is important because, by using digital
media, citizens construct an information infrastructure that is largely independent of the state. Digital media leave a lasting imprint on civil society, one that
continues after elections. The Internet allows youth to learn, for instance, about
life in countries where faith and freedom coexist (Howard, 2010).
Following Howard (2010), one would hope that the events that unfolded after the election in Iran in 2009 would translate into continued reliance on new media for political
information and social organizing. This is especially because the uprisings in the Middle
East and North Africa in 2011 also seemed to suggest that Twitter, Facebook, and mobile technologies have the potential to instigate, organize, or at least report on political
organizing and sociopolitical change. Most certainly, this role was sometimes overstated, with many characterizations of the events as Facebook or Twitter revolutions, but
these characterizations were often more descriptive than evidence or data-driven.
The Iran Media Program aimed to contribute to this debate twofold. Two years after the
election and during the uprisings in the region, we studied a systematically recruited
national sample of adult Iranian citizens. We also recruited technologically savvy Iranian
youth.

38

Summary

We examined the news sources that were important for these two samples of Iranians,
the topics they discussed via new media platforms, the experiences with and attitudes
towards online censorship and circumvention tools, and also the beliefs about new
media technologies having the potential to empower citizens politically.
Our results offer several notable patterns. We find that among both the general
population and the technologically savvy youth, television – and especially the statecontrolled broadcaster – was among the most often used news sources (with the
Internet being the most important news outlet for the youth). This finding is surprising given that – in general – in Middle Eastern societies “traditional state control
of the information media has often meant that more reliance is placed on oral and
unofficial means of communications, in the mosque, the coffeehouse, or the marketplace” (Fandy, 2000, p. 378).
This finding is especially surprising among our technologically savvy, educated
and metropolitan youth the demographics of whom overlap with the profile of those
who took to the streets in the post-election protests in Iran and who might be more
likely to distrust the government and its sources.
These results may indicate that perhaps this young population is not uniformly politicized, mistrustful of governmental sources, or primed for revolutionary action.23
Several of our other findings underlie this idea. Contradicting the claims that Twitter
played a central role in the uprisings in Iran and despite the evidence that 90% of Twitter
users in Iran live in Tehran, Twitter was the least prevalent new media platform used
by both the general population and the youth samples. This finding may suggest that
the role played by Twitter was overstated to begin with (see Lynch, 2003). At the same
time, it may be the case that Twitter was more frequently used two years prior, and
its sociopolitical role has simply diminished since then.
Recent surveys (e.g., the BBG’s 2012 survey) find patterns regarding satellite use,
viewership of the IRIB, and trust in the IRIB, underscoring the complexity of Iranian
television consumption patterns, and necessitating further research into what kinds of
programming are sought out at what times, and on which channels, whether domestic
or international. The IMP’s position is that the Iranian public, like many publics living
in countries where there is investment in controlling the flows of information internally
and externally, is sophisticated in its approach to news and information, triangulating
23 It also might indicate, however, the degree to which the Iranian public is uncomfortable answering questions
about the use of satellite television because of satellites being technically illegal and regularly seized in seasonal
crackdowns.
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from several sources which all have their various biases, and turn to entertainment,
sports, religious and cultural programming on a range of different outlets.
Further, we find that in 2011 and 2012, politics was not topping the agenda in the
“new media sphere” as accessed and created by our samples. Again, although new
media use habits may have differed immediately before and after the election, the
detected patterns are telling. They suggest that the potential mobilization via new
media has not continued and/or was not substantial to begin with (see Lynch, 2003).
All in all, neither the general population nor the Iranian youth sampled here were
particularly interested in using blogs, text messages, Twitter or Bluetooth to communicate political issues, instead discussing personal topics, new technologies and
work-related affairs.
An additional pattern merits mention with regard to internet speed access and
circumvention tools. Despite the legal restrictions on internet speed, the technologicallysavvy youth sample was using high speed internet in much larger numbers than anticipated. This cohort was accessing higher than expected speeds at home and at work,
which is somewhat surprising given that it is internet cafés that tend to have higher
speed access as well use proxy servers to enable visiting sites such as Facebook. Based
on anecdotal reports and an interview with an ISP manager in Iran, the 128 kbps limitation is not enforced across all ISPs. The manger indicated that most large ISPs, including
the one with whom the IMP spoke, sign contracts with customers for 128 kbps, but in
actuality, provide 512 kbps. As mentioned previously in the report, there are also
exceptions on the books for university students, doctors, engineers, and other professions who can justify the need for higher speed access, and they can receive up to 2
mbps.24
There seems to be a relative dispersion when it comes to problems accessing online
content on the Web, such as blocked websites, with the technologically savvy sample
reporting more problems than the internet users among the population. Similarly, it
is the Iranian youth who are more skilled and familiar with using various online tools
that help circumvent blocked websites. This suggests that while the knowledge about
circumvention tools is probably more widespread among the Iranian society than our
results indicate (due to low self-reporting), being comfortable accessing and using

24 There is an important multiplier effect at work with those that are able to obtain high speed internet. One university
student, or one engineer can provide his or her entire household and extended family with high speed internet if used
on a home computer, which is frequently the case.
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circumvention tools is rather constrained to a small group of the most technologically
skilled. Alternatively, this finding underscores the degree to which members of the
population are not comfortable admitting in a face-to-face interview context that they
have heard and would know how to access circumvention tools.
Hence, although the IMP questionnaires implemented a novel question approach
to get at sensitive topics such as satellite use and circumvention tools, it seems that
respondents still under-report their use of and familiarity with these technologies,
suggesting the need for even more accurate and novel ways of approaching these
crucial topics in survey instruments that attempt to gauge propensity of use. Such
studies would make a substantial contribution to methodological approaches to survey research in closed societies, and move us yet closer to understanding the nuanced
interplay of factors that together create the patterns of media use, content creation
and self-expressions in sociopolitical contexts where all of these meet substantial
limitations.
We hope that our studies, and the overall IMP project, will move us closer to
understanding these complex realities.
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Appendix 1
Recruitment
procedure for
Field-based study

Sample size in each
selected town

4 major
metropolitan
cities
–
Population

Sample

No. of areas

No. of interviews
in each area

Tehran

7,088,287

500

100

5

Mashhad

2,427,316

200

40

5

Tabriz

1,398,060

150

30

5

Shiraz

1,227,331

150

30

5

12,140,994

1000

Total

- Sampling frame was the map of the selected town with the boundaries created
Sampling
method

around areas of 2,000 households or approximately 10,000 inhabitants.
- 100/40/30 areas were selected by a systematic sampling method.
- In each area, a starting point in the North West Corner was selected.
- The rule for sampling was visiting 5 households from the starting point then
skipping two households to the left.
- If the selected household was locked or did not respond, the interviewer moved
to the next household.
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- In each household, one member at least 18 years old was selected using Kish grid,
serialized as per age, for the main interview.
- If the selected member was not available, an attempt was made to contact the
person two more times before resorting to substitution.
- If necessary, substitution was done either in the same household or in another
household within roughly 3 years of age range (assuring that the respondent was
over 18 years old).
- Only one interview in the household was conducted as the main interview.
- The main interview was administered after obtaining the appointment at a
mutually convenient time.
- The interview was administered face-to-face at home.

